Abstract-When using Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) in constrained embedded devices such as RFID tags, López-Dahab's method along with the Montgomery powering ladder is considered as the most suitable method. It uses x-coordinate only for point representation, and meanwhile offers intrinsic protection against simple power analysis. This paper proposes a low-cost fault detection mechanism for Elliptic Curve Scalar Multiplication (ECSM) using the López-Dahab algorithm. Introducing minimal changes to the last round of the algorithm, we make it capable of detecting faults with a very high probability. In addition, by reusing the existing resources, we significantly reduce both performance losses and area overhead compared to other methods in this scenario. This method is suitable especially for constrained devices.
I. INTRODUCTION
The implementation of Public Key Cryptography on very constrained devices such as passive RFID tags has always been challenging. Cryptographic systems based on Elliptic Curves (EC) are considered a better choice than RSA on such platforms, since they offer equivalent security at a much smaller key size. A shorter key size implies lower hardware costs and a reduced power consumption. Thus, lightweight implementations of ECC are a hot research topic nowadays. Many clever implementation tricks have been proposed to reduce the computational complexity and hardware usage. For example, using the López-Dahab algorithm [16] together with the Montgomery Powering Ladder (MPL) enables usage of just one coordinate during scalar multiplications, which saves both computation time and storage in hardware.
Implementations of a mathematically secure algorithm might be vulnerable to physical attacks, i.e. attacks that make use of physical information leakage. The two most prominent attacks in this area are side-channel analysis (SCA) and fault analysis (FA). While SCA reveals sensitive data by monitoring information that leaks from side-channels, such as processing time, power consumption, or electromagnetic radiation, FA exploits actively induced faults in the computation. Hence, countermeasures that prevent implementations attacks are vital. Since incorporating countermeasures adds extra computation time and chip area, implementing secure algorithms has been a big challenge for constrained devices such as passive RFID tags. In this paper, we present a low-cost method to protect ECC implementations against fault analysis. We target implementations using López-Dahab algorithm and Montgomery Powering Ladder, which are considered the best combination for constrained devices [20] , [12] . The proposed method detects faults induced during the point multiplication with a high probability. It is designed in a way that it (1) has a minimum overhead in terms of computation time and that it (2) reuses existing functions or circuits to reduce the area overhead.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In Section II, we recap basic notations of ECC, give a brief introduction to the considered implementation and describe common fault attacks, before we explain our method in III. Its performance and security is evaluated in Section V and Section IV, respectively. Conclusions are drawn in Section VI.
II. ECC AND RELATED ATTACKS

A. Elliptic Curve Cryptography
This section gives a brief introduction to ECC. A more comprehensive explanation can be found in [3] , [1] . An elliptic curve over a field F is defined by the Weierstrass equation:
For a binary field F, (1) can be simplified to:
The set of points ( , ) ∈ F 2 fulfilling (1) together with the point at infinity form an additive abelian group denoted as (F). The point is the neutral element of the group. The main group operations are point addition and point doubling.
A group operation on an elliptic curve consists of many operations in the underlying field. Given a point and an integer , computing = ⋅ is called scalar multiplication with scalar . In most cryptosystems, the scalar corresponds to the secret key. The security of ECC is based on the hardness of the so-called Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP), namely, finding a for two given points and , such that = ⋅ . The group given by a curve can be represented in affine form, i.e. each point is represented by two coordinates: = ( , ). An equivalent representation given by projective Jacobian coordinates. In Jacobian coordinates, the projective point ( , , ) ∈ F 3 , ∕ = 0 corresponds to the affine point
The point at infinity is represented by (0, 1, 0).
López and Dahab [16] proposed a fast and efficient algorithm for point multiplication on EC. Let = ( , ),
, and 2 = ( 2 , 2 ) be three points on the curve with 2 = 1 + . Let 3 = 1 + 2 and 4 = 2 ⋅ for ∈ {1, 2}, then the -coordinate of 3 and 4 can be computed without using the -coordinate of 1 or 2 .
A projective version of this algorithm was also proposed. Let = ( , ), 1 = ( 1 , 1 ) and 2 = ( 2 , 2 ), where 2 = 1 + and = / for ∈ {1, 2}. If 3 = 1 + 2 and 4 = 2 ⋅ , then 3 = ( 3 , 3 ) and 4 = ( 4 , 4 ) can be computed as follows:
When used in the MPL, the López-Dahab formulas have a big advantage over those using three coordinates. This is because throughout the scalar multiplication the precondition = + for using the formulas is given. The MPL is depicted in Algorithm 1. The Algorithm returns ( , ), from which = / can be derived with one division. The recovery of requires = ( , ), and [16] :
While the recovery of the -coordinate from the result of the López-Dahab scalar multiplication is possible, it is not required for common ECC applications like ECIES (EC Integrated Encryption Scheme), ECDSA (EC Digital Signature Algorithm) or ECDH (EC Diffie-Hellman) [13] , [18] . Those schemes use only the -coordinate of a point, neglecting the value. Thus, the optimizations of López and Dahab can save all storage space for -coordinates and the efforts of computing them, resulting in higher efficiency than other proposals. Thus, we aim at protecting the MPL without recovering thecoordinate using the already implemented circuits. Generally, a computation on an elliptic curve can be performed in affine as well as in projective coordinates. What makes projective coordinates the common choice is that they trade a field inversion in each point operation for an additional coordinate. However, before outputting the result, it is advisable to convert the point back into the affine representation. This not only saves costs of transferring a coordinate, but also prevents an adversary from gaining side-channel information from the projection [17] . Hence, we assume that the final result of the EC Scalar Multiplication (ECSM) is always output in affine coordinates.
B. Fault Analysis on ECC
Adversaries with physical access to a device can actively disturb the cryptographic computation and use the erroneous output (or not even the output, but the reaction of the disturbed device) to derive the secret. In order to do so, the adversary needs to induce faults on the target device. Various methods can be used, such as changing memory bits with a laser or violating setup times by inducing glitches in the clock signal. Readers who are interested in these methods are referred to [15] .
Fault attacks can be grouped into three categories, namely, safe-error based analysis [19] , [14] , weak-curve based analysis [2] , [4] , [9] and differential fault analysis (DFA) [2] . There is a fundamental difference between these three attack methods and thus their countermeasures. Safe-error attacks are based on the observation that some errors do not change the results, e.g. if dummy operations are tampered. Weak curve attacks try to move a scalar multiplication from a cryptographic strong curve to a curve. Differential fault attacks exploit the difference between a correct output and an erroneous one to retrieve the scalar in small chunks. We give a brief instruction to DFA, since our countermeasure prevents this attack.
Biehl et al. [2] reported the first DFA on an ECSM implementation. For simplicity reasons, we use a right-to-left double and add algorithm to describe this attack. Nevertheless, the same technique can be applied to other versions of the double and add algorithm as well as the Montgomery ladder. and denote the value of and at the end of the ℎ iteration, respectively. Let ( ) = div 2 and ′ be the value of after a fault has been induced. The attack reveals from the Most Significant Bits (MSB) to the Least Significant Bits (LSB).
1) Run ECSM once and collect the correct result ( ).
2) Run the ECSM again and induce a single bit-flip in , with − ≤ < . We assume that is small. 3) Note that = + ( )2 ⋅ and ′ = ′ + ( )2 ⋅ . The adversary then tries all possible ( ) ∈ {0, 1, .., 2 − 1} to generate and ′ . The correct value of ( ) will result in a { , ′ } that have only one-bit difference.
The attack works in the same way for the left-to-right multiplication algorithm. It also can be applied if is encoded with any other deterministic code, such as Non-Adjacent-Form (NAF) and -NAF. It is also claimed that a fault induced at a random moment during an ECSM is sufficient [2] .
In [8] Fan et al. provided a systematic overview of implementation attacks and countermeasures for ECC. Here we are focusing on ECSM using Montgomery Powering Ladder without employing -coordinate. Table I depicts possible attacks and the relevancy of different countermeasures for this algorithm. Table I shows that MPL without -coordinate provides inherent protection against safe error and sign change attacks. However, in order to prevent other attacks, additional countermeasures must be implemented. For example, checking the integrity of the curve parameters and the base point coordinates can prevent invalid curve and invalid point attacks, while choosing an elliptic curve which has only strong twists will prevent a twist curve attack. In order to prevent differential fault analysis, coherence of the intermediate and final result should be checked. Another possible method is to blind the scalar such that the adversary can not gain more bits of in repeated executions.
III. THE LOW-COST FAULT DETECTION METHOD
In this section we present the proposed implementation of the coherency check (CC) performed at the end of the MPL.
A CC verifies the intermediate or final results to detect faults injected during the computation, in our case the ECSM [5] . If an ECSM uses the MPL, the fact that the difference between and is always (see Algorithm 1) can be used as the required coherency. CC is an efficient countermeasure against differential fault analysis. However, if not implemented carefully, it introduces significant performance and hardware overhead.
In the case of the Montgomery ladder, a CC evaluates the equation = + to check the coherency [5] , [6] . Note that the addition + can not be performed using López-Dahab algorithm since the difference between two points is not known. Hence, the coordinates of both and must be recovered. Since the recovery requires finite field inversions, the performance overhead is significant. Besides, the coordinate of occupies an extra location in the nonvolatile memory. In addition, a straight-forward implementation of the coherency check requires a regular point addition algorithm, which introduces the overhead in both datapath and control part. In this paper, we present an efficient method to perform the coherency check using functions that are already implemented for ECSM. Let = ( −1 . . . 1 0 ) 2 be an -bit scalar and the base point. The points and denote the intermediate results of the second-last round of the Algorithm 1, which calculates the scalar multiplication ⋅ . If ( 1 , 1 ) represents the result of the last round for 0 = 1 and ( 0 , 0 ) the result of the last round for 0 = 0, the following equations hold: 0 = 2 ; 0 = + = 2 + ,
For fault-free computations, it follows that:
In order to check the coherence (6) between 1 and 1 , the last round of Algorithm 1 is modified such that it calculates the results for both possible values of 0 . Algorithm 3 gives the implementation of the proposed countermeasure. Note that the point addition in Line 17 uses the López-Dahab point addition algorithm, since the difference between 1 and is 0 , which is already calculated (Line 16). Indeed, the affine -coordinate of 0 , ( 0 ), is required for that purpose. In case the result is always output in affine coordinates (see Section II), it has to be computed anyway if the last bit 0 = 0. However, if 0 = 1 the computation of ( 0 ) is redundant.
Algorithm 3 Montgomery Powering Ladder with the Coherency Check
Require: An integer ≥ 0 and a base point ( , 1) Ensure: ( ) = ⋅ . The variables in Algorithm 3 are presented in projective coordinate system using and coordinates. Thus, we can write the following expressions for the points used in Line 11:
Since one out of 0 and 1 is the final result, we convert both to an affine coordinate system using the following set of equations: = ,
Equations (7) show that the conversion from projective to affine coordinates of both possible results can be implemented using just one inversion and five field multiplications. Knowing ( 0 ), we can reuse López-Dahab algorithm to add 1 and . The final step is the comparison of 1 and 1 + . If ( , ) denotes the sum = 1 + and 1 denotes point computed in Algorithm 3, the comparison between and 1 can be performed evaluating the following equation:
If (8) holds, the result is output depending on the last bit 0 . Note that the affine coordinates of both possible outputs are already calculated in (7).
IV. SECURITY EVALUATION
The proposed countermeasure detects faults injected during the MPL. This section evaluates security of the proposed implementation by calculating the probability that an injected fault is not detected.
The proposed countermeasure fails to detect a faulty base point provided as an input to MPL. A couple of attacks on EC implementations rely on supplying a base point that moves the whole computation from a cryptographically strong curve to a weak one. A similar attack is possible by injecting a fault right after a sanity check of the point. One example is the twistbased attack when only -coordinate is used [11] . To prevent such kind of attacks, it is advisable to choose a curve that has strong twists. A more general method to prevent this attack is to check that the result, = ⋅ , belongs to the specified curve. In the following analysis we assume this method is always used.
We assume the adversary only induces faults once. When the fault is induced, one or more registers (i.e. , , , ) can be affected. Faults that are induced during a point addition or point doubling are equivalent to faults on the results of that iteration. Thus, we simply treat the faults as forced value changes of , , or in the end of a specific iteration.
We analyze the probability of a random fault passing the check for an elliptic curve with a cofactor 2. The same analysis can be applied to curves with different cofactor. Let # be the order of the curve, and be the order of the base point P. Since has a cofactor 2, we have # = 2 .
Consider the point addition and doubling function (Eq. 3) as a map:
The map updates { , } in each iteration depending on the key bit . Given an { 3 , 4 } pair, we need to solve two quadratic equations to compute its preimages. For instance,
2 is the root of ( 2 + 4 + ) in F. Since ∕ = 0, the number of roots are either 0 or 2 with probability 1/2 each. Once we have 2 , we can also solve 3 = + (
to get 1 . It again has either 0 or 2 roots with equal probability. Thus, for a random { 3 , 4 } pair, the expectation of the number of preimages is one.
Denote by ℙ the set of { , } that lead to a successful check, where and denote the value of and after the ℎ iteration, respectively. We can divide ℙ into two disjoint subsets: and . is the set of valid point pairs, ={{ ( ), ( + )}} for all on , while includes all the rest in ℙ . Clearly, all pairs in will pass the coherence check. There are in total # elements in .
Consider faults induced during the ℎ iteration, 0 < < − 1. The faults can lead to a successful check if 0 and 1 are valid points on , and 1 = 0 + . In other words, In general, the earlier the faults are induced during the scalar multiplication, the larger ℙ is. Intuitively, faults induced in the last round will fail the check immediately if they don't lead to an valid point pair after one iteration, while faults in the earlier iteration will have more opportunities to hit an valid point pairs.
We can now derive the possibility for a random fault to pass the check. A random fault on { , } in the first iteration yields the highest possibility:
For a secure ECC implementation, 2 is relatively large. For example, = 163 is recommended for even constrained devices. In this case, the probability for a random fault to pass the check is negligible.
Power Analysis Note that although the last step of MPL is modified in order to efficiently implement the countermeasure, it preserves its resistance to simple power analysis since the key related operations are still perfectly balanced for both 0 values (Lines 17-20 in Algorithm 3).
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
This section evaluates the efficiency of the proposed solution, taking into account both performance and area overhead. The performance overhead of the algorithm with the protection is given in Table II .
It shows that there is no overhead in the key related operations except for the last key bit. Since the computations in the last round are performed for both possible values of 0 , the overhead is one point doubling (PD), either 2 or 2 (Lines 12-13 of Algorithm 3). Note that addition + is done in both cases and does not need to be computed twice. Since the conversion from the projective to affine coordinates requires a finite field inversion, at least one has to be implemented to convert the final result, even if no protection is implemented. Hence, the inversion of both 0 and 1 required for the proposed protection scheme comes with the overhead of five field multiplications (5 × ) (7). Finally, the point addition (PA) for the coherency check = 1 + and two field multiplications from (8) have to be performed. Thus, the computational overhead of the proposed countermeasure is 1 × + 1 × + 7 × . Since the point addition for the coherency check can also be performed using the López-Dahab algorithm, the overhead in the datapath and the control part is negligible. The only area overhead that the countermeasure introduces is storage overhead. It consists of two extra locations for storing and coordinates of the extra point calculated in the Line 10. of Algorithm 3. However, a common coordinate system [20] , which is often used for restricted devices, reduces the hardware overhead to one extra storing location. Note that this value is temporary and is just used to evaluate the coherency check. It can, depending on actual implementation, be stored in an already existing location which will be overwritten later on.
Comparing to the straight-forward implementation of a coherency check that does not reuse the López-Dahab algorithm to perform the final point addition [5] , the proposed implementation is more efficient in both time and area. First, it avoids additional finite field inversions in order to check the coherency at the end of the ECSM. Second, it requires neither recovering the coordinate of the base point nor storing it, which make it more efficient than the method proposed in [7] . In addition, since the same point addition is used for both regular and checking part, the proposed method avoids overhead in datapath and the controller part.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented a new efficient countermeasure to protect ECC implementations utilizing López-Dahab algorithm against fault attacks. The proposed countermeasure detects faults injected during the MPL with a high probability. Instead of adding an additional point addition formula to check the result, we propose to use the already-implemented addition formulas. We observed that the difference between the two points that are used for coherence check can be easily computed. Once this difference is known, López-Dahab can again be applied. The coherence check proposed in this paper uses -coordinate only. Hence, neither the coordinates have to be recovered, nor the coordinate of the base point has to be stored. We believe this method is especially suitable for area-constrained devices. 
